Th e Czech Republic, as many other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, faced and is still facing a pension-reform challenge. Th e diversifi cation of pension pillars led to the massive displacements of participant contributions from the public PAYG pension pillars to the newly constructed private, defi ned-contribution, fully-funded pillars. In the Czech Republic, the adoption of the relevant law was preceded by serious political confl ict between supporters and opponents of this step (both among diff erent political actors and among professionals). In an analysis of the confl ict we critically apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework. We work mainly with the analysis of policy documents, public statements of the individual actors and an analysis of voting on the relevant law in both chambers of the Czech Parliament towards the identifi cation of the crystallization process of two clear-cut coalitions between actors from both sides of the spectrum. Th e Advocacy Coalition Framework in exploring the dynamics of the public-policy process proved to be able to explain situations where there is sharp political confl ict. Th rough the lens of the devil-shift of both camps (advocacy coalitions with diff erent beliefs), each fell into extreme positions within the coalition to affi rm the correctness of their arguments and positions.
Introduction
Disputes about pension reform could be a good example of the public-policy process in which opposite forces govern (and arm) opinions of diff erent camps -the advocacy coalition. Th e key attributes of the external struggle are, according to the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the diff erences of viewpoints (ideologically conditioned) of the individual participants. Behind them, however, we can sense a number of diff erentiated interests (though oft en obscured behind the "veil" of ideological beliefs). It is not surprising that this ideologically polarized issue over time has created a coalition of stakeholders from diff erent spheres, brought together by a common vision for this particular reform strategy. With a large degree of simplifi cation, camps can be defi ned through the optics of right-left political ideologies, connected to and emphasizing their values as refl ected in pension policy. On the right side of the political spectrum, the values which resonate are the ones associated with the emphasis on the regulatory role of the market and individual responsibility, which governs the areas of strengthening the degree of equivalence in the pension system (the more you contribute now, the more you will get back later on) and the increasing role of commercial entities in ensuring seniors. On the left side of the political spectrum, the value of solidarity in the pension fi eld associated with the role of public authorities and institutions, the fi rst pillar of the pension system, is stressed. Th is simplifi cation has its exceptions, of course. For example, in the Czech Republic, the right-wing parties reduced the degree of equivalence of the publicpension pillar with the aim of reducing its role in the whole pension system at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, they strengthen the degree of equivalence of the public-pension pillar, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court in 2011.
If this ideological and political struggle in the case of such an important longterm cyclical system, such as the pension system, does not result in a political compromise and agreement, the likelihood that the adopted solution will not be sustainable is increased. Th is happened in the case of the second pillar of the Czech pension system.
The advocacy coalition framework
Th e Advocacy Coalition Framework (hereaft er ACF) is an infl uential theory of the process of public-policy creation, which is based on the idea that interest groups are organized in policy communities within the policy domain (Birkland 2005, 226) .
Th e ACF scheme (based on Sabatier and Weible 2007) shows a subsystem of public policies with coalitions, their sources and beliefs and the outputs and outcomes of public policies. Th e subsystem is anchored in the broader political system with relatively stable parameters and external events (dynamic element).
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Source: Weible et al. (2011, 352) , Weible and Nohrstedt (2013, 128) .
ACF works with the social-psychological model of the individual, which is diff erent from the model of the rational individual used by the public-choice theory. Th e key element of the concept is the existence of belief systems. ACF perceives core beliefs and values as the main driving force of political behavior, i.e. the dealings of actors. Another ACF assumption is the so-called aversion of an individual to losses -a prospective theory (Quattrone and Tversky 1998) . We simply tend to remember our losses more than our gains.
Advocacy coalitions are defi ned as a group of actors who share basic beliefs about the public policy (policy core beliefs) and coordinate their actions. Advocacy coalitions form a dynamic environment in which the actors belonging to the coalition may vary according to their beliefs and attitudes toward current public-policy issues.
Advocacy coalitions have diff erent resources and tools to achieve their goals: 1) access to formal authority that has the right to make political decisions (legislators, judges), or directly to the membership of such an actor in the coalition (e.g. political parties in power); 2) public opinion and public support; 3) information, knowledge; 4) mobilizing sympathizers and supporters; 5) funds; 6) the presence of charismatic leaders (Kingdon 1994; Mintrom and Vergari 1996) .
Due to the nature of advocacy coalitions, a radical change inside the subsystem is extremely unlikely. ACF therefore defi nes external direct or indirect shocks as agents of change.
Analysis -Commencement and termination of fully-funded,
defi ned-contribution "second pillar" using ACF
In the following, we will analyze the behavior and development of two advocacy coalitions (hereinaft er: AC). One AC promotes the introduction of the private, defi ned-contribution, fully-funded pillar (shortly: second pillar) to the Czech pension system. Another AC holds the opposite opinion, i.e. it is opposed to the introduction of the second pillar to the Czech pension system.
Formation of advocacy coalition -the introduction of a second pillar
Th e formation of the advocacy coalition, supporting the introduction of a second pillar in the Czech pension system, started slowly with attempts to convince experts as well as the general public of the fi scal unsustainability of the public, defi nedbenefi t, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension system (shortly: fi rst pillar) due to the aging population. Th is topic has been present in the discussions since 1995, but it received top attention and political support at the dawn of the new Millennium.
Under the caretaker government (before early election in 2010), the Expert Advisory Corps (PES) was established in January 2010. Its main objective was to analyze the current state of the pension issue in a broader context and recommend to future governments possible ways of reforming the pension system. Th e creation of the team was commissioned by Vladimir Bezděk, who had originally worked at the Czech National Bank (CNB) and led another commission, which played an important role in designing the unsuccessful reform of the pension system in 2003.
Vladimír Bezděk got a "carte blanche" to select his associates. He approached this task with off ers especially for those professionals who had opinions which were relatively close to his own to participate in the team. A political component was not included in PES. Most experts established on the advisory board worked in the commercial sector, some worked with entities that were potential "sellers" of the new product under consideration. Its creation was also suggested in the fi nal PES paper.
Th e pension reform proposal of the expert advisory group (PES) included Variant I (majority's) and Variant II, called minority's. Variant I counted with the fi rst pillar, which should go to 25 from a 28 % premium rate and should be adjusted according to the reform proposals. Th e second pillar will be funded from 3 % of the 28 % premium rates plus individual contribution of 2 % of rough salary of the insured individual. Participation will be mandatory for all persons under 40 (as of the year of the start of the reform). Variant II involved the following arrangements. Th e premium rate (28 percent) of the fi rst pillar will not change. Th e second pillar will be operated by the reformed pension funds; direct government support will amount to 3 % of premiums if the participant will save at least the same amount. Entry to the second pillar will be voluntary for those who enter into it, but if they participate, the removal of insurance premiums will be compulsory (MPSV 2010) .
Majority's version
Early elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament, held in 2010, resulted in the formation of a new right-wing coalition government, composed of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), TOP 09 and Public Aff airs (VV). Th is coalition brought together parties that in the election programs consistently suggested fundamental pension reform, albeit with diff erences in individual concepts. Th e government, led by ODS chairman Petr Nečas restored the activities of the National Economic Council (hereinaft er NERV). Among the new members were Eduard Janota, Minister of Finance from a previous period and Vladimír Bezděk, chairman of the Expert Advisory Group (PES). Th e experts at NERV were invited to contribute to the preparation of key government reforms, not excluding pensions. Th e activities of NERV followed Variant I of the PES advisory group. Th e proposed solution was based on arguments about the fi nancial unsustainability of the Czech pension system and promoted the strengthening of the merit system supported by, among other things, the introduction of the second (private, fully-funded, defi ned-contribution) pillar to the Czech pension system. Other allies in advocacy coalition were potential sellers of new products, e.g. pension savings funds, which would become available upon passage of the pension reforms. A voluntary association of legal entities -Th e Association of Pension Funds (later renamed the Association of Czech Pension Companies) -which covers institutions operating in the pension market and capital savings (operators of retirement savings, supplementary pension savings and pension) independently participated in the arguments supporting the introduction of the second pillars and additional forms of pension saving, releasing numerous press statements and comments, including the following information campaign on the Internet: "You are getting old. Th ink. "
Minority's version
GOVERNMENT
An umbrella organization united the fragmented arguments of individual entities and thus strengthened its position both within the advocacy coalition and within outside representatives to the advocacy coalition with opposing views. Even aft er their individual lines individual entities continued to support the elected government's strategy to introduce the second pillar. Financial institutions participated in presentations and workshops articulating the need for the introduction of a second pillar.
Pension companies also participated in the fi nancing and processing academic studies. ČSOB Pension Fund Stability, as an example, engaged the study think tank IDEA in the academic workplace CERGE-EI, which supported the argument which consisted of accentuating the future fi nancial unsustainability of the PAYG pension insurance system (ČSOB 2012).
Th e result of the joint eff orts of actors of this advocacy coalition resulted in the proposal of the governmental pension reform, which allowed for the introduction of the second pillar. However, it was constructed on a voluntary basis, due to the inevitable compromises that were required by the need to sustain the fragile coalition government.
Th e governmental proposal included:
Opt-out of 3 % from the 28 % rate levied on insurance premiums plus a mandatory additional 2 % (overall a citizen would thus be burdened with 30 %).
Th e selection will be carried out by a single collection point (SCP) .
Th e administration will be carried out by the current reformed pension funds and the newly established pension companies.
Selection in the form of a life annuity, life annuity with survivor's pension for three years, or a 20 years' allowance.
Opt-out is voluntary.
Th e voluntary nature of the second pillar as proposed by the government would eventually cause profound disagreements between the government and representatives of NERV on what can be accepted as a compromise solution and what already threatens the potential success of pension reforms. Some representatives of NERV distanced themselves from the governmental proposal (Kohout 2011 , Tyden.cz 2011 . Th e recommendations for pension reform of NERV were signifi cantly modifi ed by the government, which resulted in the need of NERV to present a deviation from the original idea.
One of the members of NERV, Jiří Rusnok, commented on the government's compromise proposal as follows: "Th e government reached, aft er diffi cult negotiations, this compromise that was only politically acceptable for it but certainly not optimal. I am afraid that under the given conditions many people will not go voluntarily into bringing in money from the continuous system as well as the additional payment. I do not know how they would be motivated by this…" (Adámková 2011 ).
Dissenting opinions of individual members of NERV are also refl ected in the need for the entire advisory board to express their vision of the reform of the pension system and to highlight the diff erences from the Government of the presented proposal: "Recommendations of the National Economic Council were oft en distorted and even misinterpreted. … NERV recommended a number of so-called parametric modifi cations to the fi rst pillar … NERV also recommended the introduction of a small but mandatory second pillar where citizens that are under 40 years old would be obliged to save part of their pension. … Th e position of the National Economic Council to the pension reform is much more comprehensive, however the above aspects are frequently misinterpreted. Th erefore, the listed members of NERV wanted to take this opportunity to set the record straight" (Bezděk et al. 2011) .
Although the fi nal decision in the coalition of actors ended in disagreements, the whole process of preparation and formulation of the reform concept linked the same opinions of actors from diff erent areas into a relatively "compact" unit. No. 426 / 2011 , which introduced the second pillar into the Czech pension system.
The activity of this advocacy coalition culminated in the approval of Act
Formation of advocacy coalition -the refusal of the second pillar
Th e advocacy coalition at the left side of the political spectrum cemented the opposite opinion. Its members did not believe in the necessity of introducing a second pillar for addressing the issue of pension security. To the participants of the coalition strengthening the equivalence of the system connected to the second pillar meant that the solidarity provided by the public system, especially its limitation, was a core value. At the same time they feared the weakening of the revenue side of the fi rst public PAYG pillar of the pension system without adequate reductions on the expenditure side during the same period. One of the important actors was the civic association CESTA -the Centre for Socio-market economy and open democracy (forthwith CESTA), formed in January 2011. Th is think tank, in December 2011, presented two alternative scenarios of pension reform (a version with a notional defi ned-contributions pension system similar to the Swedish one, and a version taking into account the care about children in the PAYG system). However, all that united this advocacy coalition was a consistent belief which refused to introduce a second pillar into the Czech pension system; disagreements in this coalition could be found in the detailed ideas about the concepts and alternatives of reform, which are illustrated in the presentation of diff erent reform concepts (CESTA 2011a (CESTA , 2011b .
A traditional ally of the Social Democrats are unions, represented mainly by the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS). It is therefore not surprising that even the pension policy found that these partners encountered jointly shared beliefs. Regarding pension policy, trade unions are a relatively strong actor in the Czech Republic. In the discussions on pension reform, they protested against the introduction of the second pillar and criticized the government for its reluctance to discuss alternative proposals. In their statements, they criticized the government's proposals in detail and submitted their own concepts. ČMKOS "… rejects the simplistic and one-sided focus regarding pension reform on the fi nancial operation of creating a more costly infrastructure in the form of a second private savings scheme" (ČMKOS 2011).
Th e center-left spectrum is logically complemented by the Communist Party (KSČM), which consistently insisted on only parametric adjustments of the current, PAYG public pillar and opposed the second pillar in the Czech pension system. Opposition to the introduction of the second pillar (i.e. supporting its abolition) was thus evident from the Communist Party, although neither the Social Democrats nor ČMKOS ever received an explicit confi rmation of their (KSČM's) opinions. Alternative proposals for pension reform are indeed one of the many weapons used in the political battle for voters on the left side of the political spectrum.
The legislative procedure
Th e adoption of Act No. 426 / 2011 Coll. regarding pension savings was preceded by debate in the Chamber of Deputies and then the Senate. Th e resulting line vote refl ected the dispute between advocacy coalitions. Members of advocacy coalitions exclusively on the right side of the political spectrum were advocating the introduction of a second pillar -without exception, whereas members of the advocacy coalition fi ghting against the introduction of the second-pillar pension system (ČSSD, KSČM) were adamantly opposed. Th e discussion was conducted in the same argumentative spirit that accompanied previous ideological battles between advocacy coalitions. On the one hand, the fi nancial instability of the system was raised as well as the need to strengthen merit, on the other hand there was a resounding defense of solidarity and concern about the weakening of the fi rst pillar of the pension system. Th e "Devil shift " is also refl ected in the sharp rhetoric used during the approval process.
Th e government submitted a draft bill on 30 June 2011. Th e fi rst reading took place on 13 July 2011. Th e second reading passed both a general and detailed debate on 30 August 2011. Th e third reading took place on 9 September 2011. Th e bill was approved. 86 out of 147 deputies present voted for the bill (ODS, TOP 09, VV, 1 independent member). 61 deputies were against the proposal (ČSSD, KSČM, 1 independent member). On 19 September 2011, the law was forwarded to the Senate. Th e Czech Senate rejected the bill. Th e vote was attended by 61 senators. 43 senators rejected the bill (36 -CSSD, 5 -KDU-CSL, 2 independent members); 18 supported it (14 -ODS, 4 -TOP09 plus Party of Mayors).
Th e bill returned by the Senate was voted on, at the Chamber of Deputies on 3 and 6 November 2011. Deputies supported the original bill. 109 out of 179 deputies present voted for (ODS, TOP 09, VV, 1 independent member), 70 deputies were against (ČSSD, KSČM, 2 independent members).
Th e Act was delivered to the President for his signature on 9 November 2011. Th e President did not sign nor veto it, and therefore it became law on 24 November 2011 and came into force on 1 January 2013.
Th e voting on the law in parliament only endorsed the composition of the two advocacy coalitions that were formed in the previous coordinative and communicative discourse.
In terms of resources of actors, we can consider the coalition promoting the second pillar of the Czech pension system as being dominant. Among its members were actors who were directly part of the executive branch of government or had access to other actors who were able to infl uence political decisions or possess information resources (government-coalition political parties, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs, government advisory bodies, pension funds, research institute IDEA-CERGE), which was formidable due to the previously mentioned type of players AC (coalition actors). Th e second AC, upon review of the resources of its actors, must be considered to be minor.
Before the new general elections
New extraordinary elections to the Chamber of Deputies happened at the end of 2013. To the forefront of the election debate came the measure to abolish the newly passed element of the pension system by all member of the advocacy coalition opposing the governmental decision. During the election, the platforms of ČSSD and KSČM explicitly expressed that, in case of electoral victory, they would seek its abolishment. Argumentative strategies were governed by the defense of solidarity as a key element in the compulsory public social insurance, which this newly introduced element of the system weakens, and the eff ort to maintain the sustainability of the fi rst pillar of the pension system.
After general elections -disintegration and transformation of advocacy coalitions
Th e parliamentary elections in 2013 were won by the center-left Social Democrats (ČSSD) and they formed coalitions, which opened up opportunities to promote the objectives of the opinions of the close partners united in opposition to the introduction of the second pillar of the pension system. In the coalition agreement (ČSSD, newly-established political movement ANO, KDU-ČSL) and subsequently in the government's program declaration (2014), there occurred the explicit intention to create an expert commission to consider a further pension reform path and to advise how to end the second pillar (Vládní programové prohlášení 2014). Christian-democratic party KDU-ČSL became a new ally, joined the government's criticism of the second pillar of the pension system, which it deemed incapable of reform, and stood for its abolition. One surprising ally was a new entity, the political movement ANO. In their election program they did not dispute the existence of the second pillar, on the contrary, their aim was strengthening its robustness. In the end, ANO, however, agreed with the government's policy statement, in which the coalition partners' commitment to the abolition of the second-pillar pension account remained.
Aft er the election there arose a situation when the advocacy coalitions were hit by external (indirect) change. Clusters with signifi cantly diff erent political orientations took over power in the state. Some political parties "disappeared" from the arena of the key actors (e.g. VV -Public Aff airs), while some had returned (KDU-ČSL). Th e old advocacy coalitions, formed substantially in the form of former rivals vs. the coalition of the former opposition crumbled. Th e advocacy coalition opposing the introduction of a second pillar gained, as its actor, the so-called "formal authority", possessing the right to make policy decisions. Th is change fl ipped the role of the formerly dominant minority coalition and thus paved the way for the fulfi llment of one of its important goals.
On the basis of the coalition agreement and the government of the Czech Republic's policy statement, the Expert Committee for Pension Reform (the acronym OK) was established in order to seek broad political consensus about the continuation of the pension reform. Key criteria which followed in the draft pension reform were defi ned as the ability of the system to ensure adequate and decent pensions, strengthening the principle of merit, settlement transfers between family and society and the long-term sustainability of the pension system (Poslání 2014). Although at the beginning of the meetings of OK, which were concerned with the question of how to end the second pillar, there was a clash of former traditional advocacy coalitions regarding other activities of the Committee, when attention was focused on the broader concept of pension reform, there was an interesting shift . Former members of advocacy coalitions began looking for space to promote their interests in the new situation and to form new alliances. Th e attention of some members of the former government advocacy coalition had moved to the robust support for the third pillar (voluntary pension insurance / savings with state contribution, established as soon as in 1995).
On 23 October 2015, the Czech parliament passed a law abolishing the second pension pillar as of 2017 and strengthening the third pillar as of 2016.
Discussion
It seems to be obvious that the representation in the executive branch of government coalition is crucial in the battle of advocacy coalitions to orientate pension reform. Further, executive representation in the advocacy coalition increases the likelihood of enforcing the changes. If the government participated in the advocacy coalition, there is a likelihood of success, explicitly expressed by the enforcement of the concept which that particular advocacy coalition presents, and which has a higher probability of success than the coalition which does not have such representation. Within the framework of the dueling advocacy coalitions in the case of pension reform in the Czech Republic, the government and political parties were the key members of the advocacy coalition whose concept was enforced in the Czech Republic.
On the contrary, the absence of the executive in an advocacy coalition can (knowing the impossibility of enforcing their own concepts) limit the activities of this coalition to attempt to block the implementation of the proposals of the opposing coalition. Nevertheless, the advocacy coalition opposing the introduction of the second pillar of the Czech pension system was focused not only on a "negative" campaign within the meaning of attempts to block its creation, but also on formulating alternative proposals for solutions. Th e advocacy coalition was not successful in an attempt to block the introduction of the second pillar until aft er the extraordinary parliamentary elections redistributed power, however.
Our analysis also focused on the uniformity of opinions within coalition. Both identifi ed coalitions show unity and consensus among its members in the primary focus. In this case, the purpose is to perceive the introduction or failure to introduce (or cancel) the second pillar of the pension system. In the secondary aspect, however, we can already identify diff erences in opinion. In the fi rst coalition, which advocated the introduction of a second pillar, the diff erences of opinion were already being expressed regarding the conception of the very nature of this institute, with respect to its construction. NERV, concurring with fi nancial institutions, promoted compulsory participation as an essential parameter for the pillar to work eff ectively. By contrast, the government, certainly under internal political pressure, eventually pushed for the concept of voluntary participation. Th e second advocacy coalition was united in its negative stance toward the second pillar, whereas with the question of the "correct alternative concept of pension reform", the consensus was not achieved. Due to the variability of opinion of members of this coalition, a unifi ed "opposition" counterproposal to pension reform was not advanced. Proposals for pension reform varied from complex concepts about pension reforms with the goal of sustainability of the system while maintaining a high degree of solidarity, to proposals for the introduction of the NDC system via adjustments that take into account, e.g., caring about children, to a "mere" parametric modifi cation of the fi rst pillar.
We also paid attention to the motivation of actors to become part of a coalition. We have already proved that some actors are motivated to be a member of a coalition in which they are a member of the executive government, mainly because of the higher probability of bringing about change. Th us this type of advocacy coalition is more attractive to actors (due to the higher potential to succeed). If the aim of the actors is to promote partial interest, then the ideological background may not necessarily be the only factor that determines membership in the coalition. Th e coalition which promoted the introduction of the second pillar of the Czech pension system lost its players who possessed executive and legislative powers. Discussions about the newly created platform Expert Committee on Pension Reform, established by the newly formed government of the Czech Republic aft er the early parliamentary elections in 2014, suggest a shift of "interests" of some actors. Financial institutions pragmatically abandoned support for the second pillar (aft er the decision on its dissolution), and strategically focused on advocacy towards the additional third pillar with respect to strengthening it. Based on this observation, we can confi rm that the ideological kinship may not be the only factor that determines the membership of actors in AC. However, it is necessary to take into account the diff erences between the actors, in particular their ideological distinctiveness and their interests. Th e reasons for the actors to be involved in the activities of any coalition may be diff erent. In some (such as political parties) coalitions play a key role in the ideological kinship with other actors. In others (such as private or public institutions) the ability / inability (individually or in a team advocacy coalition) to promote their vested interests plays an important role.
Advocacy coalitions' rivalry can also be the source of an additional fl ow of information relevant to political decision-making. It is the result of advocacy coalitions dueling with opposing views, which strengthens the argumentative strategies within them. We can trace the positive information eff ect resulting from the coordination argumentative strategy, even in the variants of the reform concepts presented by actors within one advocacy coalition. Joint activities (seminars, presentations, studies) were presented to the public as well as to the coalition partners by fi nancial, research, and even educational institutions that were associated with the presentation and communication of reform options. Th ere was a parallel increase in the interpretive approaches in the opposition coalition represented by the sharing and use of information between the traditional social partners (ČMKOS), the political parties on the left of the political spectrum and civic associations (CESTA). Information value is refl ected in the treatment of the subject by political parties and, ultimately, in the fi nal presentation of the topic by government executives. One of the most signifi cant pieces of information shift s, which the confl ict brings to the coalition, is the creative writing of the media (to increase their interest in the subject). Th is benefi t may be weakened by special interest misinterpretations, the resulting biases and sometimes by unprofessional media messages covering factually complex themes like the pension system and its reform.
Conclusion
Th e Advocacy Coalition Framework proved functional in the explanation of situations where there were sharp political confl icts. Th rough the lens of the devil-shift of both camps (advocacy coalitions with diff erent beliefs), each fell into extreme positions within the coalition to affi rm the correctness of their arguments and positions. Shared beliefs, their own opinions and views became more entrenched, deepening the barrier between the coalitions, as well as solidifying the convictions of political opponents.
From an analytical point of view, the application of ACF was tied to a specifi c institutional form of political system, the actual distribution of political power and diff erentiated interests. If the institutional environment is set up in a way that does not necessarily require agreement across the political spectrum and within the broader framework of actors, ACF identifi ed an unwillingness and inability to seek a compromise between competing advocacy coalitions. We were witnessing the adoption of sometimes extreme solutions, which were enforced by the current position of the actors in the political arena, and its radicalism has the potential for at least partial success, especially in an underdeveloped political culture of negotiation skills and preparedness to make compromises.
In situations where the actors are forced, whether by an institutional environment (political culture of negotiation and seeking compromise, tradition of tripartite agreements, etc.) and / or external infl uences (e.g. the results of elections) to negotiate at the "common table", ACF can be applied sparingly. In these conditions, it is interesting to see the regrouping of advocacy coalitions under the infl uence of the changing institutional conditions and the impact of these rearrangements, as well as the infl uence of marginal actors on the argumentative strategies and decisionmaking potential of the main actors. We still encounter the limits of the Advocacy Coalition Framework itself, since beliefs and views in such environments recede into the background and the actors begin to further promote their specifi c, diff erentiated interests. 
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